There has been a marked increase in comparative research examining the dynamics of regime formation in the United Kingdom and the United States. These authors consider regime formation processes in three deindustrializing cities: Detroit, Michigan, and Birmingham and Sheffield, England. The article identifies two cross-cutting themes: the effects of national/international political and economic forces on local governance and the role of public and private interactions in regime formation. Finally, in an attempt to enlarge the scope of regime theory, the authors develop a comparative perspective on urban governance based on the concepts of governing structures and policy agendas.
focused and informed debate on questions of the dynamism of urban politics in both countries.
The purpose of this article is to develop a comparative approach to the study of urban governance that integrates national and local levels of analysis by analyzing the structures and processes of governance in three large industrial cities: Birmingham and Sheffield in the United Kingdom and Detroit, Michigan, in the United States. The first part of the article formulates a conceptual framework for making cross-national comparisons of urban governance that focuses on governing structures and policy agendas. The second traces changes in the national contexts of urban governance in the United Kingdom and United States. The next three sections tell the tales of urban development politics in Birmingham, Detroit, and Sheffield from 1980 to 1997. The sixth section applies the comparative perspective developed in the first section to the case studies. The conclusion returns to the broader issue of what is to be learned from U.K./U.S. comparisons of urban governance.
URBAN GOVERNANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
One leading explanation of urban governance is regime theory (see Elkin 1987; Stone 1989 Stone , 1993 . Regime theory is predicated on a number of assumptions. Following Stone's (1989) social production model, we see urban governance as rooted in the conception of political power as a means to accomplish certain goals: power to and not power over (Stone 1989 (Stone , 1993 . This ability to produce desired policy results emerges out of the creation of informal governing alliances among private-sector business and community leaders and government officials (DiGaetano 1997) .
One critical problem posed by regime theory, however, pertains to the level of analysis at which it operates. Although Stone (1989 Stone ( , 1993 rightly underscores the importance of social production in the process of urban governance, he cannot escape a distinctly American bias (see Harding 1994; Stoker 1995) . That is, Stone's regime theory assumes the weak state system of American federalism in which local governments lack sufficient authority to accomplish significant governing tasks. As a result, local officials must garner private-sector support to generate critical resources to compensate for the deficient governing capacity of the American local state. But this assumption makes the use of Stone's regime theory somewhat awkward when applied to British urban politics, in which the scope of public-sector authority traditionally has been wider. Urban governance in the United States is characterized by a greater emphasis on spatial rather than party politics, wider autonomy to undertake local economic development, a more diffuse electoral system, and less central control and financial regulation than is true for the United Kingdom. This suggests that urban regime analysis needs to be situated more explicitly in a comparative political economy perspective (see DiGaetano 1997) .
COMPARING URBAN REGIMES: GOVERNING STRUCTURES AND POLICY AGENDAS
One distinctive feature of regime studies has been the predilection to identify and classify different sorts of local governing arrangements (see, e.g., Stone, Orr, and Imbroscio 1991; DiGaetano and Klemanski 1993; Stoker and Mossberger 1994; Kantor, Savitch, and Haddock 1997) .
1 In our comparison of three deindustrializing cities, we differentiate among urban regimes on the basis of two defining elements: governing structures and policy agendas. First, governing structures are the modes of intermediation through which different interests coalesce (see Schmitter 1977) -that is, they define the nature of political relationships among participants in the process of governance. At least four distinctive governing structures can be identified in the urban politics of liberal democratic nations. These are summarized in Table 1 .
Clientelistic structures of governance implicate personalized, particularistic, reciprocal, and hierarchical relations among politicians and clients (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984) . The governing logic is one of pragmatic exchange among political leaders and constituents. The party machine, which dominated American city politics during the industrial era, was a governing institution based on political clientelism. The party boss brokered governing relations by granting favors to constituents through the dispensation of political patronage.
Corporatist structures, in turn, institutionalize strategic rather than pragmatic modes of cooperation between governmental and nongovernmental elites such as business or community leaders (Schmitter 1977 (Schmitter , 1981 Birch 1993) . Corporatist governing logic is predisposed to consensus building, and the resulting ruling alliances tend to form exclusionary circles of powerful interests. The progrowth alliances of business elites and big-city mayors bent on the revitalization of America's downtowns in the postwar era exemplify corporatist governing structures. Business leaders and mayors formed public-private partnerships around downtown renewal because, if successful, each would derive economic and political benefits, respectively (see Levine 1989) .
Managerial structures are based on formal, often bureaucratic relations among government officials and private interests (see Alford and Friedland 1985; Pierre 1997) . Governance is imbued with a technocratic or ideological logic, rather than consensus building or favoritism. The new public management, in which privatization and contracting-out services are seen as ways to achieve greater efficiency and economy in local government, represents a managerial form of governance (see Peters 1996) .
Finally, the core governing relationship in a pluralist structure involves government as a broker or arena for competing private interests (see Schmitter 1977) . Concerns about conflict management dominate the pluralist governing logic, with different politicians forming alliances with different private interests in the contest over competing policy solutions. Decision making, as a result, tends to be more open and decentralized in comparison to the other governing structures, and conflict is often managed through a process of bargaining to compromise (Dahl 1961; Judge 1995) .
The second defining features of urban regimes are policy agendas. 2 Progrowth policy agendas center on the problem of economic development, in which cities attempt to devise strategies to encourage public infrastructure development (transportation and other facilities) and private investment (principally, business) (see Peterson 1981; Mollenkopf 1983) . Social reform policy agendas, in turn, address problems of social inequality, seeking to redress perceived inequities by redistributing resources from more to less affluent members of society (see Clavel 1986; DiGaetano 1997) . Urban social reform policy agendas often contain items such as affordable housing development, job training and creation for the poor, and community service. Finally, caretaker policy agendas are confined to routine service provision such as police and fire protection, refuse collection, and the like (see Stone 1993) . What distinguishes caretaker policy agendas from the other two is that there is little or no effort to achieve social or economic change through urban policies or programs.
THE EVOLVING URBAN POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES
Recently, exploration into the impact of national economic and political forces on local governance have emerged from what might broadly be seen as both regulationist thinking (Mayer 1995) and those more explicitly concerned with questions of regime formation (DiGaetano 1997; Keating 1993) . Many observers regard national economic and ideological forces as likely to prove the most important single factor in framing local activity and governmental choice. This is not, of course, to deny the importance of the local. But on the broad canvas there is a strong argument that national impulses impose such strong mediating forces on the local that, even when alternative options may be considered in theory, in reality governing elites tend to make similar choices (Molotch 1993) .
Our model of urban governance compares regimes along two dimensions: governing structures (clientelistic, corporatist, managerial, pluralist) and policy agendas (progrowth, social reform, and caretaker). Before we can begin our comparison of Birmingham, Detroit, and Sheffield, however, we must first turn our attention to the differing national contexts.
A CONTEXT OF INDUSTRIAL DECLINE
In the post-1970 period, a number of big cities in Britain and the United States saw their manufacturing sectors shrink dramatically. Plant closings and the flight of manufacturing investment to suburban sites or even overseas, in reaction to the national and global competition to drive down production costs, sent shock waves through the local economies of many former industrial giants. Deindustrialization, as some have called it (see Bluestone and Harrison 1982) , proved particularly wrenching for cities heavily dependent on a single industry. The automobile industry, for example, dominated the economies of Birmingham and Detroit, and Sheffield's economy revolved around steel production and the fabrication of metal wares. Table 2 reports the effects of economic restructuring since 1980.
Between 1981 and 1991, Birmingham lost 70,000 manufacturing jobs, with the proportion of workers engaged in manufacturing dropping from 39.0% to 27.5%. Similarly, in Detroit, the manufacturing workforce declined from 113,000 in 1980 to less than 70,000 in 1990, with the percentage of jobs in the city's manufacturing sector falling from 28.6% to 20.5%, respectively. Deindustrialization also pushed up unemployment rates, which were below 10% in the 1970s. Unemployment in Detroit stood at 16.1% in 1980, compared to a national average of 7.1%, and remained in the double digits throughout the decade (Michigan Employment Security Commission n.d.). By 1990, Detroit's unemployment rate had slipped to 12.9%, although it was still more than double the national rate of 5.5%. A similar picture emerged in Birmingham, where unemployment climbed from 4.0% in 1974 (the national average was 2.6%) to 9.4% in 1980. But by 1982, unemployment more than doubled to 21.9%, compared to a national rate of 12.1%. By the end of the decade, unemployment in Birmingham had receded to 11.0%, but, like Detroit's, it was still nearly twice the national rate of 5.8%. Nevertheless, national economic recoveries in the 1990s spurred the revival of manufacturing in the United Kingdom and the United States, at least in production terms. Car production, as a consequence, rebounded in both cities (Birmingham Economic Information Centre n.d. ; Cheeseright 1993; O'Brien 1993) .
Sheffield also experienced massive deindustrialization during the 1980s. Between 1981 and 1991, there was a net loss of 30,000 jobs from the city's workforce, with an absolute loss in the manufacturing sector of more than 36,000. As many as eight major steel companies, which employed about 25,000 people, had closed in the Lower Don Valley, the city's major industrial heartland, by the mid-1980s (Dabinett 1995) . As a result, Sheffield's official unemployment rate, which stood at 4% in 1978 (below the national average of 6%) rose to 11.3% in 1981 and continued to rise slowly to 13.7% in 1991. By the 1990s, however, the level of production output climbed, especially steel and heavy engineering. Indeed, Sheffield forged 1.3 million tons of crude steel, about 7% of the U.K. total, in 1995, the largest amount ever produced in the city (Sheffield City Council and Sheffield Training and Enterprise Council 1996) . (1983, 1993a, 1993b) . NOTE: Years in parentheses are for Birmingham and Sheffield. In this context of industrial decline and economic restructuring, it is not surprising that economic development came to dominate the policy agendas in Birmingham, Detroit, and Sheffield. Despite this apparent convergence in policy, however, governing structures differed greatly among the three cities and over time. In part this can be explained by changes in national government policy in both countries.
SHIFTS IN NATIONAL URBAN POLICY AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
Seventeen years of Conservative rule, from 1979 to 1996, altered the direction of Britain's urban policy agenda. Margaret Thatcher's governments (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) overhauled the nation's local governing system, restricting severely local authority spending and revenue generation (see Barnekov, Boyle, and Rich 1989; Goodwin 1992) . The Thatcher government also created a number of quasi-national government organizations (quangos) that assumed responsibilities previously administered by local authorities but now came under the jurisdiction of government-appointed boards dominated by private-sector representatives. In terms of urban policy, these included urban development corporations (planning and development powers) and training and enterprise councils (training and business development). In short, central government intervention in urban policy and local affairs became increasingly directive, curtailing local authority discretion and power in fiscal and regeneration policy making.
In November 1990, Thatcher resigned as prime minister. Her successor, John Major, inherited a number of problems, including controversies over Britain's role in the European Union, repercussions over popular discontent with the poll tax, and growing political friction between the Conservative central government and Labour Party-dominated local authorities (Peele 1995, 108) . The Major administration changed government intervention from directive to competitive. For instance, regeneration grants-such as City Challenge (which targeted deprived urban districts for regeneration assistance) and its successor, the Single Regeneration Budget (which consolidated a number of urban programs)-were awarded on the basis of bids submitted by localities. Moreover, these competitive grant schemes placed a high premium on the creation of partnerships in the preparation and implementation of local regeneration grant proposals (see Stewart 1996) . Similarly, the European Union revamped its grant system, also adopting a more competitive model for traditional regeneration grant programs such as the European Regional Development Fund (physical regeneration) and the European Social Fund (antipoverty), as well as for newer ones such as URBAN (community development).
In contrast to Britain, the federal government in the United States mounted a full-scale retreat from national urban policy in the 1980s. Beginning in 1981, national politics in the United States was dominated by Republican administrations for 12 years. Under the rubric of fiscal conservatism, Presidents Ronald Reagan (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) and George Bush (1989 Bush ( -1992 sought to roll back levels of federal aid to local governments, particularly urban programs that had grown substantially since Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty in the mid-1960s. Some local aid programs were eliminated entirely, such as federal revenue sharing and urban development action grants (both in 1986) . Others, such as community development block grants, suffered draconian cuts (see Judd and Swanstrom 1998) . The Reagan administration claimed that such reductions in federal aid would wean local governments from their fiscal addiction to federal assistance (Ross and Levine 1996, 426) .
When Democratic President Bill Clinton took office in 1993, a more traditional Democratic approach toward cities was adopted. For example, Clinton pressed Congress to pass empowerment zone legislation, which was enacted in 1994. This new program provided for tax breaks to businesses investing within the zone's boundaries and for direct federal assistance ($100 million) to six cities (Ross and Levine 1996, 441) . Empowerment zone designations were awarded on the basis of a competition among applicants, in which communities offering the best proposals were selected. However, when Republicans gained control of both chambers in Congress in 1994, national attention to urban problems waned, and the federal government once again retreated from urban policy.
BIRMINGHAM: THE POLITICS OF GROWTH, 1980-1997
Birmingham politics in the postwar period differed from that of many other large English local authorities, which tended to be dominated by the Labour Party. In Birmingham, control of the city council bounced back and forth between Labour and Conservative administrations. Irrespective of party control, though, the city council had long cultivated a cooperative relationship with the local business community. Indeed, such Brummie pragmatism, according to local lore, dates back to the days when Joseph Chamberlain, as mayor in the mid-1870s, embraced the civic gospel of municipal improvements (Birmingham City Council 1989) . This relationship intensified in the 1980s in the face of rapid deindustrialization and central government intervention that threatened local authority initiatives.
EMERGENCE OF A PROGROWTH REGIME, 1980-1986
In the early 1980s, Birmingham suffered dual crises of deindustrialization and deep recession, which made a deep impression on the city's political psyche. Both parties, when in the majority on the city council, made strong commitments to a progrowth agenda that sought to reverse Birmingham's economic fortunes. This agenda contained an intersecting set of strategies, including industrial retention and diversification, city center revitalization, and training and employment (Birmingham City Council 1989) . Around these plans and projects, an incipient form of corporatism began to surface. For example, with the Conservative Party in the majority, the city council formed a partnership with Lloyds Bank and Aston University to develop a science park on derelict manufacturing property adjoining the university campus. Aston Science Park, as it was called, was seen as a means to diversify the city's economy by attracting high-technology firms to Birmingham. It also demonstrated the city council's willingness to work with the private sector to carry out its ambitious economic development agenda (Birmingham City Council 1984) .
After 1984, corporatism reached full bloom in Birmingham. The Labour administration that took power after the 1984 elections formed a closed inner circle around the council leader, Richard Knowles, who fought to develop an international convention center that had been conceived by the previous Conservative administration in 1983. The development of the International Convention Centre (ICC), which ultimately cost the city £180 million and was completed in 1991, became the centerpiece for what became known as the city's "prestige project" strategy to revitalize the city center.
The Knowles circle planned the financing and implementation of prestige projects such as the ICC, the National Indoor Arena, and a retail and office development known as Brindley Place behind closed doors and then presented them to the Labour group as faits accomplis. City officers were also willing participants in this insider style of council decision making, which enabled the projects to move forward with a minimum of controversy and delay.
The Labour leadership also extended the use of public-private cooperation in the latter half of the decade. For example, the Thatcher government was considering the possibility of setting up an urban development corporation (UDC) in Birmingham. To preempt this, the Knowles circle joined forces with the Birmingham chamber in proposing the establishment of a locally controlled urban development agency (UDA) (Docklands Consultative Committee Support Unit 1993), headed by a board consisting of representatives from both the private sector and the city council. The strong support shown by Birmingham's business leaders for the idea convinced the Conservative government to allow the creation of the Heartlands UDA in east Birmingham, the only one of its kind in England. The Heartlands UDA broadened the network of public-private sector cooperation in carrying out the city's development agenda and thereby strengthened the corporatist arrangements that had been established earlier in the decade.
ADJUSTMENTS IN PROGROWTH CORPORATISM, 1990-1993
In the early 1990s, the city's progrowth alliance was forced to make some adjustments. First, with the creation of the Birmingham Training and Enterprise Council (TEC) in 1990, relations within the progrowth regime, whose central players were the Birmingham city council and chamber, obviously had to change. Although the TEC's appearance ruffled some feathers initially, it was fairly quickly accepted into the fold of the progrowth governing coalition. In addition, the city's financial and professional services sector emerged as an independent political player, and, to fuse economic power with political clout, leading executives from the financial and professional services industry founded Birmingham City 2000 in 1990. Formed as a lobbying and service organization, Birmingham City 2000 used its expertise and connections with central government and elsewhere in a variety of ways (research, professional services, lobbying, etc.) to advance the city's progrowth policy agenda. The interpolation of these new centers of privatesector power, however, did not disrupt the existing governing structure. On the contrary, working and strategic relationships among the city council, the TEC, Birmingham City 2000, and the chamber crystallized into a densely woven corporatist regime.
Central government constraints on local authority expenditures and the shift to a competitive system of grants-notably, City Challenge and later the Single Regeneration Budget-reinforced the corporatist governing structure. That is, central government increasingly required visible and active cooperation from the private sector in the submission of bids and the implementation of proposals. As a consequence, the TEC, Birmingham City 2000, and the chamber became essential partners in attracting regeneration grants. This was certainly the case in the collaborative efforts to win a City Challenge grant for the inner-city area of Newton/South Aston.
However, the progrowth regime also propagated partnerships in areas where central government constraints and directives did not necessarily force the issue. For example, a political controversy arose within the city council around its perceived ineffectiveness to market the city nationally and internationally. A consultant's report recommended that an independent marketing agency be created. At this point, Birmingham City 2000 stepped in and drew up a business plan for what became known as the Birmingham Marketing Partnership (BMP). The BMP was established in 1993, partly funded by the city council, but with a majority of board representation from the business community. Similarly, in 1991, the city council, TEC, and chamber founded the Birmingham Economic Development Partnership (BEDP) as a strategic body to coordinate activities among the three partners. The BEDP assumed responsibility for operating the government-funded Business Link (business services) when it was set up in 1993 (BEDP n.d.).
Finally, in 1992, talks were held between the Knowles circle in the city council and the Birmingham chamber around the viability of the Heartlands UDA. The city council and chamber concluded that the Heartlands UDA had made insufficient progress in regenerating east Birmingham because it lacked funding (Docklands Consultative Committee Support Unit 1993). To remedy this problem, the city council's finance and management committee secretly petitioned the secretary of the environment to declare Heartlands a UDC. This would furnish a steady stream of funding and give it the planning and development powers necessary to redevelop the area. The deal struck between Birmingham's progrowth regime and the central government, however, made the resulting Heartlands Development Corporation a unique UDC. The city council received half the seats on the board, with the other half appointed by the secretary of state (Birmingham Heartlands Development Corporation 1993) . Moreover, in operational terms, the formation of the Heartlands Development Corporation did not disturb the close and cooperative working relationship between it and the city council that had been a hallmark of the Heartlands UDA. Thus the Heartlands Development Corporation has operated more like a partnership than a government-funded quango.
GOVERNING STRUCTURE REALIGNMENT, 1993-1997
In 1993, a power struggle within the ruling Labour group produced a new leadership for the city council. This leadership was more pluralistic and open than the Knowles circle had been. The new council leader, Terresa Stewart, initially sought to dislodge the council's progrowth policy agenda and replace it with a back-to-basics agenda that emphasized education, social services, and housing. To the extent that funding for these purposes was spared from the deep budgetary cuts in council spending enjoined by central government directives, this agenda has prevailed. Indeed, economic development, as with other policy areas, incurred significant reductions in expenditures.
Nevertheless, the alliance of progrowth city councillors and officers, senior business executives, and TEC and Heartland Development Corporation officials has remained a potent force in city politics. Through its dense network of working relationships and through the more formalized institutional complex of partnerships, the progrowth alliance has ensured that economic development remains a key component of the city's policy agenda. For example, the city has become involved in a number of large-scale economic development projects since the back-to-basics leadership took the reins of power. These have included a millennium commission bid for a prestige project in the city center known as Millennium Point. Also, a high-profile campaign by an alliance of national and local leaders persuaded the Ford motor company to choose Birmingham as the location for the production of its new Jaguar X200 sports car by providing an incentive package of £80 million in public subsidies. Finally, the city council, under auspices of its chief executive, sponsored a symposium in 1997 that brought together business interests and public officials to address the issue of city center planning. In effect, the progrowth regime's successful prestige project agenda was now causing transport and parking problems in Birmingham's central business district that threatened to hinder future commercial investment.
Several factors account for the uneasy marriage between the back-tobasics Labour leadership and the progrowth alliance around these issues. First, a central government initiative known as City Pride, open to only three cities in England, has brought Stewart and other Labour leaders in close contact with business leaders and quango officials around an effort to formulate a 10-year "vision" for Birmingham. Although City Pride promised no additional funding, it has, according to local leaders, lessened suspicion and fostered a greater sense of trust between business leaders and the Stewart Labour leadership. Also, as a pluralistic polyarchy, the new Labour leadership does not speak with one voice on economic development. In fact, several prominent Labour leaders, including the deputy leader, Brian Bird, have actively supported the progrowth agenda. Finally, the progrowth alliance is deeply embedded in Birmingham's governing arrangements. As a result, initial efforts by the Stewart leadership faction to install a social reform policy agenda were bound to fail. Instead, the Stewart leadership group and the progrowth forces have reached a kind of accommodation: Each, at least publicly, acknowledges the importance of the other's agenda.
DETROIT: TROUBLE IN THE MOTOR CITY
The catastrophic race riots of 1967 ensured that the question of race would dominate the politics of Detroit. And as factories closed and high-paying manufacturing jobs were lost to automation or modern land-extensive facilities in the suburbs or foreign lands, Detroit was rapidly becoming a poor, African-American city.
In the early 1970s, the city's business establishment took the initiative to advance a progrowth policy agenda. First, the city's downtown business leaders formed Detroit Renaissance, which became the organizational muscle of Detroit's white corporate establishment on economic development matters. Also, around the same time, a coalition of business leaders, led by Henry Ford III, spearheaded a downtown revitalization program by developing the Renaissance Center, a 72-story hotel surrounded by four office towers located on the city's waterfront. In time, the Renaissance Center became the symbolic focal point for the city's progrowth policy agenda (see Hill 1983) .
In 1973, Coleman Young was elected as the city's first African-American mayor. Although Young pursued an aggressive policy of affirmative action in trying to redress the racial imbalance in the municipal bureaucracy, he adopted a surprisingly conciliatory relationship with the Motor City's white business establishment. Indeed, a corporatist governing structure was forged around the city's downtown renaissance agenda. The governing alliance between Young and the city's business leaders, moreover, was institutionalized through the creation of three quasi-public development corporations: the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation (DEGC), the Downtown Development Authority (DDA), and the Economic Development Corporation (EDC). With governing boards composed primarily of corporate executives and public officials, the DEGC, DDA, and EDC functioned as coordinating agents for Detroit's progrowth policy agenda.
TENSIONS IN THE PROGROWTH REGIME, 1981-1993
In the early 1980s, what was known locally as the automobile recession wreaked devastation on Detroit's economy, with the Big Three automakers losing about $3.5 billion in 1980. Furthermore, federal cutbacks in urban aid under the Reagan administration affected Detroit acutely, with federal assistance to Detroit for economic development cut nearly in half over the 1980s. In this context of federal retreat and economic crisis, political tensions disrupted the city's corporatist progrowth regime. Indeed, in the highly charged environment of economic decline and racially divided politics, clientelism began to displace the corporatist arrangements that had first been formed in the 1970s.
Political clientelism in Detroit manifested itself in several ways. First, Young built a personal political machine that enabled him to grind out impressive election victories in the 1980s, winning more than 65% of the vote in 1981 and 60% in 1985. Young's campaign organization raised millions of dollars, receiving substantial contributions from city employees, firms that conducted business with the city, and developers whose projects received public subsidies (see DiGaetano 1988) . Allegations of corruption also dogged the Young administration in the 1980s. Indeed, a number of federal investigations of the Young administration discovered improprieties in the administration of city contracts. None of the federal investigations, however, led to indictments that ever touched Young personally. In the face of scandals and increasingly poor relations with the press, Young retreated into an ever smaller circle of political associates and friends, primarily AfricanAmericans, christened his "kitchen cabinet" (Edmonds 1987) .
As decision making in the Young administration became increasingly personalized and secretive, the mayor figured ever more centrally in the selection of projects and developers that would receive municipal support on siting, building permits, financial aid, and tax incentives (Pepper 1996a) . A handful of developers and business leaders won favor with Young personally, becoming trusted investors in the city's commercial development projects. Some were newcomers to Detroit politics in the 1980s, such as Greektown's Ted Gatzaros and Jim Papas, but others were veterans, such as Al Taubman, who specialized in shopping malls, and Max Fisher, who earned a fortune in the gas and oil business but later turned to real estate investment. Taubman and Fisher orchestrated development of an up-market residential complex and marina on the Detroit River shoreline known as Riverfront West Apartments. The chair of the Stroh Brewery Company, Peter Stroh, also had cultivated a working business relationship with Mayor Young, financing the development of Brewery Park and the Stroh River Place complex in the downtown area. The policy consequence of such clientelism was that publicsector support for development projects generally became reflexive reactions to opportunities as they arose, rather than parts of a shared strategy among regime partners. Development decision making, simply put, lapsed into a game of "let's make a deal" on a project-by-project basis.
Probably the most spectacular project to land on Detroit's doorstep was General Motors' Poletown factory (see Darden et al. 1986; Jones and Bachelor 1993) . In 1980, General Motors approached Mayor Young with a proposal to construct a state-of-the-art auto assembly plant in Detroit. The Poletown plant would replace two older General Motors factories. General Motors insisted the city find a 500-acre site but relented when 350 acres were pieced together from the defunct Dodge Main plant in Hamtramck and adjacent parcels in Detroit. The Young administration was hard-pressed to meet General Motors' specifications and deadlines, and to consummate the deal, the Young administration offered a generous (some would say overly generous) bundle of public subsidies that included land acquisition and clearance, tax abatements, use of eminent domain and relocation of existing residents and business, and federal urban development action grants and community development block grants. Completed in 1983, the Poletown plant cost the city $200 million in public subsidies, about a quarter of the total bill for the development project (DiGaetano 1989b) .
Poletown also exacted a political cost on the Young administration (Jones and Bachelor 1993) . Poletown residents and business owners, whose homes and businesses were threatened by the project, mounted a grassroots campaign to derail development of the assembly plant. Local media coverage often treated such neighborhood opposition with sympathy, painting the Young administration in less than a favorable light. Reports of the large cost overruns entailed in developing the Poletown auto factory tarnished further what Young considered to be one of his most important successes as mayor (Jones and Bachelor 1993) .
In the meantime, the corporatist alliance between the white downtown business establishment leaders and the Young administration fell victim to racial and clientelistic politics. One of the most salient examples of this was the political struggle over the Detroit strategic plan. Fundamental differences on the strategic plan divided Mayor Young and business leaders. Interestingly, it was Detroit Renaissance, not the mayor, that proposed the plan in 1987. The strategic plan comprised a comprehensive strategy to tackle the city's social and economic problems, and specific task forces (jobs and economic development, education, crime, and city image) were formed to address each of these. Controversy quickly ensued, locking Mayor Young and the business community in a power struggle over who legitimately should take the lead in planning for the city's future. Moreover, in the original task force structure, the issue of race relations had been omitted. Young demanded that a task force be formed on race before he would cooperate. Underlying all these conflicts, it seemed, was the fact that Mayor Young had taken umbrage at Detroit Renaissance's unilateral decision to propose the strategic plan because it left the impression that the Young administration had lagged behind the business community in assuming citywide leadership responsibility. As a result, the mayor never enthusiastically supported the strategic planning process, and when the final report was released in November 1987, Young announced that he would implement only those recommendations in the plan that suited his administration.
The city's progrowth regime sputtered along through the late 1980s and early 1990s, completing a few high-profile development projects such as a new state-of-the-art Chrysler assembly plant on Jefferson Avenue. Like Poletown, however, much controversy was stirred over the size of the public subsidy ($264 million), cost overruns, and the mishandling of land acquisition for the Chrysler Jefferson Avenue project (DiGaetano 1989b; Jones and Bachelor 1993) . This period witnessed a number of conspicuous regime failures, including several attempts to win voter approval for casino gambling in Detroit. Also, the city council blocked the Young administration's strenuous efforts to develop a giant skyscraper on the city's waterfront that would house headquarter operations of the Comerica banking concern. Objections to Comerica were raised because it would have limited public access to the Detroit River and involved the demolition of the city's Ford Auditorium, the home of the Detroit Symphony since the 1950s. Finally, the first proposal to build a new Tiger Stadium on the edge of the central business district stalled amid local disputes about preserving the existing and legendary Tiger Stadium.
REINVENTING THE CORPORATIST PROGROWTH REGIME, 1994-1997
Political exhaustion seemed to afflict the mayoral administration as electoral support for the mayor slipped to 56% in the 1989 election (from 60% in 1985) (Willing 1992). Also, business leaders began calling for his retirement, at first only in private but eventually in more open defiance. Meanwhile, the administration's preoccupation with secrecy and personalized politics caused relations with the local media to deteriorate further. Recognizing that in many ways his administration had become a caretaker regime, Mayor Young decided to retire from politics. A former State Supreme Court justice, Dennis Archer, decisively defeated his rival, the attorney and former police commissioner, Sharon McPhail, garnering 57% of the vote in the November 1994 general election (Toy and Trent 1993; Vlasic, Toy, and Kiska 1993) .
In his first term, Mayor Archer evoked considerable optimism among city leaders and voters alike, especially from those who had found Young's secretive and combative style counterproductive. The local media in particular welcomed Archer's more open and conciliatory manner. Archer also sought to heal political wounds caused by Young's continuing battles with Detroit's largely white suburbs. Central to Archer's strategy was reconstituting the city's progrowth agenda. By forging a renewed political consensus on the question of rebuilding Detroit's decrepit economy, Archer repaired the city's frayed and fragile corporatist governing structure. This was accomplished in several ways.
First, Archer incorporated the city's business leaders directly in the policy-making process by forming a land-use task force (LUTF), headed by a suburban developer, to study issues of land-use change across the city. Second, the Archer administration engaged in an arduous process of community consultation and consensus building in preparing the city's bid for a federal empowerment zone grant (see Thomas 1997) . Because empowerment zone grants required demonstration of broad-based cooperation and support from business, government, labor, and neighborhood organizations, Detroit's designation as one of six cities to receive a full empowerment zone grant was seen as a harbinger of a new era of consensus politics. It was also viewed as a brilliant political coup for the new mayor.
Despite the public euphoria over the city's empowerment zone designation, however, downtown revitalization remained the central focus of the progrowth regime's policy agenda. This became apparent with the creation of the Greater Downtown Partnership (GDP), whose membership was composed of business, civic, and philanthropic leaders. Moreover, the Archer administration and the Detroit Lions professional football team and the Detroit Tigers baseball team negotiated a deal to build two new sports stadia side by side in the Foxtown section of downtown. In both cases, the local media highlighted the cooperation and coalition-building skills of Mayor Archer (Pepper 1996b) . In his second term, the political momentum continued, with many observers agreeing that despite some minor glitches in economic development issue switching, Archer deftly wooed the business community and the local media into a political marriage around downtown renaissance that celebrated the development of gambling casinos, sports stadia, and other attractions.
SHEFFIELD: FROM RADICALISM TO PARTNERSHIP
Apart from two years in the late 1960s, Sheffield has been controlled by the Labour Party since 1926. Typically, at least two-thirds of the councillors are Labour, and five of the six parliamentary constituencies returned Labour members to Westminster. (In the 1997 election, the remaining Conservative seat at Parliament fell to a member of the third party, the Liberal Democrats.) Politics within the city were dominated from the 1920s to the early 1980s by what has been termed a Labourist tradition (Hampton 1970) . The local economy, based largely on the production of steel and heavy engineering in large plants, provided an environment within which craft organizations and trade unions flourished (Child and Paddon 1984) . Some unions sponsored Labour candidates and often provided the most active and influential members at local and constituency levels.
Until the early 1980s, relationships between the city council and the local business community were relatively uncontentious. In line with other local authorities, the Sheffield city council generally viewed production as beyond its remit, and major policy debates focused on housing, education, social services, and transportation. Although the council played a role in zoning, acquiring, and servicing industrial land, policies for production were seen to lie with the market and national government. This cozy arrangement, however, was soon to change.
THE ERA OF RADICAL INTERVENTION, 1980-1985
The radicalization of the local Labour Party coincided with the twin crises of deindustrialization and severe economic recession in the early 1980s. The city council and its trade union allies produced a series of sectoral analyses exploring the root causes of this economic crisis (Sheffield City Council 1984 Sheffield Trades Council 1982) that identified the main culprit as central government. Its policies in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was argued, had proved disastrous for the city. Macroeconomic policy had induced a severe recession in steel-using sectors, public investment in the nationalized sector had fallen sharply, and efforts to privatize parts of the steel industry had led to reduced output and employment. Public assets, it was charged, had initially been handed over to the private sector.
This interpretation did not pass unchallenged. Other commentators argued that the rapid contraction of employment and output in steel was an inevitable consequence of poor management, overmanning, restrictive practices, and unwise investment (Aylen 1984) . But little to contradict the city council's analysis was heard from the local business community, which, in any case, was deeply divided. Many business leaders had consistently argued for a shakeout in industry, but few welcomed the scale of retrenchment that occurred between 1979 and 1982.
The governing structure that emerged could only be characterized as a managerial regime. In 1981, the city created an employment department, whose first director was a radical political economist. The department was given a wide brief: to coordinate the council's activities to prevent further job loss, alleviate the worst effects of unemployment, stimulate new investment, create new types of jobs, and explore new forms of industrial democracy (Sheffield City Council 1982) . It was given a limited initial budget of £2.5 million per annum.
It is important to stress that the creation of an employment department was as much a political initiative as an economic one. According to its first director, John Benington, the primary aim of the department was "to liberate the resources of the local state and put them at the service of the working class movement, the women's movement and community based movements" ("A Parable" 1984, 83) . The department was helping to restructure the economy to the benefit of labor (i.e., a social reform policy agenda). It was to develop opportunities for the production of socially useful goods in democratically controlled organizations. There was a degree of realism about the scale of intervention possible for any local authority, yet a palpable feeling emerged that what was happening in Sheffield could stimulate a debate in the Labour Party about the role of the state in both local and national economic policy.
An evaluation of the employment department's activities in the first half of the 1980s must make a distinction between broader strategic issues and program implementation. In terms of the latter, many projects initiated by the council proved effective and innovative (Blunkett and Jackson 1987; Cochrane 1988) . A number of cooperatives were assisted in their formation by the authority. A range of new socially useful products, including equipment for the disabled, an advanced humidifier, and software for the blind, were designed by the product development unit of the council.
These limited benefits, however, need to be set against some real difficulties (Abel 1985; Cochrane 1988; Goodwin 1989 ). There were tensions between the department and other more pragmatic factions within the authority. Not all councillors were eager to embrace the top-down (i.e., managerial) approach adopted by some department officers because the city had always stressed that economic development should emerge from an active community base (Blunkett and Green 1983) . Crucially, too, the strategy did not work. The resources available to the department, £18 million in its first seven years of existence, were minute in comparison to the massive disinvestment in steel and heavy engineering. Although the reality of intervention was a long way divorced from the rhetoric, the latter had one obvious effect: It dampened any enthusiasm the market had for investing in the city. Hardly any development took place in the city in the first half of the 1980s.
THE EMERGING PARTNERSHIP, 1986-1989
In 1983, the local Labour Party argued that "we now need to claim for a locally elected authority like Sheffield the right for greater community and workers control and influence over employment and the local economy" (Employment Manifesto Working Group 1983, 1) . Five years later, the leader of the council could argue that the public and private sectors, working together in partnership, had been able to break down barriers and bring about cooperation in a range of projects likely to provide jobs for the city (Betts 1988) . Somewhere in the mid-1980s, a sea change in attitudes took place within the city council, which produced a regime shift from social reform managerialism to progrowth corporatism.
In examining this transformation, a distinction can be made between immediate local effects and broader national impulses. At the local level, a number of issues emerged in the middle years of the decade. The previous leader of the council, Blunkett, was elected to Parliament and replaced by Betts, who proved to be a pragmatic leader in charge of an authority increasingly adopting collaborative relationships with business. Other changes in key personnel occurred. The first head of the employment department left and was replaced by a less ideological figure. In 1986, the Metropolitan County of South Yorkshire was abolished by the central government, and a number of its officers, who were more progrowth than their city counterparts, were transferred to the city council's employment department.
Although local forces were important in focusing attention on the merits and defects of radicalism, these debates were conducted within a wider context of national economic and political change. Sheffield's experiment in radical local intervention was intended to influence the wider debate in the national Labour Party. The results from this experiment were to be assimilated into the Labour Party's alternative economic strategy, which was decisively rejected by the national electorate in 1983. That election heralded a period of Conservative hegemony and the prospect of increasing central control of local government. Sheffield's main political allies also disappeared in 1986 with the abolition of the metropolitan counties and the Greater London Council. Also, from the mid-1980s onwards, the national Labour Party shed its more radical policies in an attempt to regain the middle ground of British politics. If Sheffield were to perpetuate a radical program of local economic intervention, it would travel a lonely road.
Within the evolving national context, it is hardly surprising to find that after 1985, the Sheffield city council and the business community began a process of reconciliation-one that fostered the development of a corporatist governing structure. On the local authority's side, the personnel involved were the leader of the council, several prominent politicians, and heads of some key departments. Much of the drive for partnership in the private sector came from the chamber of commerce, although several business leaders provided the focus for most private-sector activity. This handful of key business figures-all white, male, and middle aged-initiated and sustained most partnership programs in the 1980s and into the 1990s.
In 1987, these corporatist relationships crystallized in the form of the Sheffield Economic Regeneration Committee (SERC). The SERC consisted of representatives from a range of local interests: the authority, the private sector, trade unions, community groups, higher education, and the Sheffield Development Corporation (SDC). The last of these was established by the central government in 1988, with an initial budget of £50 million, to regenerate the city's traditional industrial area, the Lower Don Valley. Although the SERC embraced a range of local constituencies, the real driving forces behind much that happened were the local authority and the chamber. In common with other similar U.K. coalitions, the SERC identified a series of predictable market-oriented issues as constituting the core economic problem of the city. Questions of image, the attractiveness of Sheffield to the market, and the need to provide the right environment for private investment dominated the SERC's public announcements. A previous president of the chamber of commerce argued that "Sheffield is a good place in which to make a living, a good place to invest" (Sheffield Partnerships Ltd. and SERC 1988) .
In attempting to overcome poor market perception, the SERC acted as a catalyst and coordinator for a wide program of activities. A series of themes was identified by the SERC as constituting a vision for the city (SERC 1990) . Several of these appeared overblown or merely a rationalization of past events. The argument, for example, that the city might become a world leader in research technology or a new decision center for Britain appeared overly optimistic. Nevertheless, despite the inchoate nature of the SERC's vision, the city's partnership presided over a series of initiatives. The SERC operated as a broker, teasing out resources from a wide range of existing budgets in the public and private domain. Partly as a result of the SERC, the city saw an upsurge in property development.
Between 1986 and 1989, more than one hundred £1 million plus schemes were granted planning permission (Sheffield City Council 1988) . Many of these were relatively small scale, but one, Meadowhall, sited on a previous steel works, was a £240 million retail and leisure complex, one of the largest in the nation. The most surprising of the new developments, however, was the decision by the International Federation of University Sports (FISU) to hold the 1991 World Student Games (WSG) in Sheffield. The WSG was to become the most controversial of the city's initiatives. New construction was undertaken, amounting to some £147 million for the provision of two new swimming pools, a new athletics stadium, and an indoor arena. However, the games spawned little in the way of sponsorship, advertising, or private capital investment.
REFORGING PARTNERSHIPS IN THE 1990S
One feature of this period was the increasing dominance of central government policy. This expressed itself in two ways. First, partnerships in the city were reformulated to give more importance to the SDC and the Sheffield Training and Enterprise Council (TEC), set up by the central government in 1990. Second, an increasing proportion of urban regeneration income was to be channeled through centrally ordained competitions. From 1991 onwards, the government began to reorient its regeneration funds toward competitive bids-notably, City Challenge, the Millennium Fund, and the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB). The need to search for new and additional funding to implement projects was well illustrated by the two bids for City Challenge funds in 1991 and 1992, both of which were to fail.
Investment in the early 1990s was being attracted to the city primarily through major public works: The WSG facilities opened in 1991; the South Yorkshire Supertram, a £200 million plus investment, was given government approval and grant aid; and the SDC continued to invest in the Lower Don Valley through road construction and the preparation of sites. Other major investments in the city were undertaken by the city's two universities (Sheffield and Sheffield Hallam), Sheffield Combined Heat and Power (CHP), and Yorkshire Cable. A limited number of major commercial developments were constructed and occupied by, among other agencies, the Norwich Union and the government's Department for Education and Employment.
Partnerships within the city were also reforged into a more obvious manifestation of a corporatist structure after another Conservative victory in 1992. The new body, the Sheffield Liaison Group (SLG), came together in late 1992 and published The Way Ahead strategy (SLG 1994) . Previous partnerships and strategies were acknowledged, but the need to move forward was recognized: "Our emphasis is on action-action to create jobs through the generation of wealth" (SLG 1994, 4) . There was some shift to small-scale projects, and more overt consideration was given to the industrial structure in the city with the Business Link and Regional Technopole proposals. Whatever its import within the city, there can be little doubt that the new SLG was perceived in a positive light by the central government. All four Single Regeneration Budget bids submitted under the aegis of the liaison group between 1993 and 1997 were successful.
In line with other local regimes in the United Kingdom, greater importance was given to the role of central government agencies, the universities, and further business involvement in the form of The Cutlers Company and the chamber of commerce. It is important to stress, however, that the CLG has a much smaller constituency than was the case for the SERC. The CLG has about 14 members. The revised SERC, renamed the Sheffield Partnership 2000, has a potential membership of more than 50, with representation from trade unions, community and voluntary groups, the police, the Sheffield Racial Equality Council, the chamber of trade, the Co-operative Development Group, and so on. Not surprisingly, in light of this scale of representation, Sheffield Partnership 2000 explicitly adopted an advisory, rather than an executive, function.
Sheffield's governing structure, in other words, widened to include new entities, such as the TEC and CLG, but remained fundamentally corporatist in character. Also, the regime's progrowth policy agenda, although it continued to emphasize city center revitalization, had been amended to include industrial development outside the central business district.
COMPARING DEINDUSTRIALIZING CITIES
In an economic sense, Birmingham, Detroit, and Sheffield represent a single type of postindustrial city. All were cities dominated by a single industry that in the post-1970 period endured the wrenching pain of deindustrialization. But do these common experiences of deindustrialization create what can be perceived as a separate or distinct regime? Our case studies would suggest the answer to this question is no. Indeed, as indicated by Table 3 , despite remarkably common economic experiences, the structures and processes of governance developed in the three deindustrialized cities from 1980 to 1997 varied considerably both across the cities and over time. This realization, however, in no way renders our comparative case studies futile. On the contrary, by comparing three deindustrialized cities, we can, for analytical purposes, hold economic factors constant in trying to explain the formation and development of urban regimes. This leaves us with the national institutional context and local politics as explanatory variables.
Corporatism emerged in all three cities, although not necessarily at the same time (see Table 3 ). This suggests that nothing in either the U.K. or the U.S. intergovernmental structures systematically prevent or discourage the development of corporatist governing structures. Moreover, some have gone as far as saying that the conservative revolutions ushered in by the Thatcher and Reagan administrations produced a convergence in local governing patterns between the United Kingdom and United States (see Fainstein 1994; Barnekov, Boyle, and Rich 1989) . That is, the politics of public-private partnership and progrowth agendas became common to urban governance in both nations. The competitive grant systems that were introduced in the United Kingdom and United States during the 1990s encouraged further consensual relations between public-and private-sector leaders, which probably explains why corporatist arrangements were present in all three deindustrialized cities by the mid-1990s.
In the 1980s, Birmingham's corporatist governing structure involved an ever-tightening alliance between the city council, particularly the Knowles Labour leadership after 1983, and business leaders around prestige projects such as the ICC. Even the introduction in the early 1990s of central government quangos, the TEC and Birmingham Heartlands UDC, and the formation of Birmingham City 2000 by city center business leaders did not disrupt these corporatist relations. Instead, corporatist arrangements strengthened through the proliferation of partnerships, such as the BMP and the BEDP, and the installation of the Birmingham Heartlands UDC. A change in the Labour leadership in 1993, in which Knowles was replaced by the left-leaning Stewart as council leader, appeared to be a harbinger of pluralist politics. That is, the city council initially became the battleground for warring back-tobasics and progrowth political factions. Rather quickly, however, the two sides reached accommodation on a mixed progrowth/social reform policy agenda. As a consequence, a loose form of corporatism ensued.
In Detroit, a corporatist regime composed of Mayor Young's administration and the city's downtown business establishment was formed in the 1970s around a renaissance policy agenda. This regime, however, faltered in the 1980s as racial divisions and clientelistic practices disrupted the progrowth governing alliance. In the mid-1990s, a change in leadership, from Mayor Young to Mayor Archer, reforged the corporatist relations between the city administration and the business establishment. Archer's more open and conciliatory leadership style enabled him to rebuild corporatist relations with the city's business leadership, as testified by the creation of the GDP and land-570 URBAN AFFAIRS REVIEW / March 1999 1980 -1985 Managerial Social reform 1986 Corporatist Progrowth use task force. This was reinforced by the politics of consensus building around Detroit's empowerment zone bid and a number of marquee downtown development projects (such as the sports stadia and casino gambling). In Sheffield, from the middle part of the 1980s, an alliance of city government officials and business leaders (primarily the chamber of commerce) reached a consensus through the SERC on the strategic means and ends of Sheffield's emerging progrowth policy agenda. This corporatist governing structure was later retooled by the creation of the SLG in 1992, which was more exclusive in its membership than the SERC and emphasized implementation over strategy. Furthermore, the SERC was renamed the Sheffield Partnership 2000, and its membership was broadened to include trade union, community, and other group representation. City center revitalization topped the policy agenda of the corporatist regime, with the development of the South Yorkshire Supertram and a number of city center cultural development projects.
Urban governance based on managerialism seems to have been confined to British cities. The weak state tradition in the United States, as reflected in public-sector dependence on business investment and other limitations on municipalities, probably militates against the formation of managerial governing structures in American cities. Certainly Detroit, our only American city, never developed a managerial governing structure. In sharp contrast, with broad public authority and substantial resources, managerial regimes were common in Britain before the 1980s (see Pahl 1977) . Furthermore, the strong tradition of professionalism in local administration, with council officers chosen primarily on the basis of merit rather than partisanship or patronage, reinforced the managerial ethos. The managerial governing structure may have become a relic of Britain's past. That is, as the Thatcher and Major governments increasingly restricted local authority powers and resources, managerial governing structures became harder to sustain, and many turned to the politics of partnership in the late 1980s and 1990s.
Among the three deindustrializing cities, only in Sheffield did managerialism dominate local economic development policy making. In the early part of the 1980s, the local Labour leadership and city officers created a managerial governing structure in which the city council devised and implemented Sheffield's policy agenda promoting socially useful production. The managerial governing structure ensconced in the city's employment department, however, was rapidly dismantled as the Thatcher government imposed fiscal and other restrictions that effectively undermined the city council's ability to continue on its path of social reform managerialism.
Pluralist governing structures did not emerge in any of the three deindustrializing cities. Although it appeared that political pluralism might take hold in Birmingham when the Stewart leadership assumed the reins of power on the city council in the mid-1990s, corporatist relations were reestablished as business and Labour leaders agreed to pursue a mixed back-to-basics and progrowth policy agenda.
Finally, the decentralized structure of the American state, which vests considerable autonomy in local governments, provides fertile ground for the politics of clientelism (see DiGaetano 1989a). Also, the less ideological nature of party and electoral politics in the United States means that political pragmatism and political brokering are more familiar features of American city politics (see DiGaetano 1989a). The more centralized state structures in Britain, the difficulty of using executive appointments as political patronage (because of the highly professionalized system of local administration), and the more ideological party system inoculate urban governance against political clientelism.
Detroit was alone in the development of a clientelistic governing structure. In the early 1980s, corporatist arrangements in Detroit weakened as the Young administration increasingly developed a siege mentality and withdrew into secrecy. Also, as political loyalty and personalized relations became more and more important to Mayor Young, political clientelism began to flourish. Favored developers received public subsidies for downtown projects, and policy making became a game of deal making, as illustrated by the cases of the Poletown and Chrysler Jefferson auto assembly plants. Moreover, tensions heightened between the Young administration and the Motor City's powerful white business establishment, which eventually occasioned a breakdown of consensus within the progrowth regime. In part, dissension played out along the lines of racial politics, manifested palpably in the disputes over the preparation and implementation of the Detroit strategic plan. But the increasing political isolation of the Young administration and the spread of clientelistic relations were also sources of contention and disenchantment.
In sum, the lessons to be learned from this comparative case study are twofold. First, national institutional contexts appear to set certain parameters in defining urban regimes. Although corporatism appeared in all three cities, managerialism occurred only in Sheffield and clientelism only in Detroit. In large part, this can be attributed to the different political cultures and state structures in the United Kingdom and United States. Second, as the stories of Birmingham, Detroit, and Sheffield illustrate, local politics were clearly instrumental in shaping the distinctive features of local governing structures and policy agendas. In particular, differences in the governing structures and policy agendas of Birmingham and Sheffield in the early 1980s could only be explained by the differences in local polities.
